In July 2025, Tokyo’s Chiyoda Ward submitted a request to the real estate association to attach two conditions to condominiums built using urban development incentives: "no resale within five years of purchase" and "no multiple purchases in the same building under the same name". The move rang alarm bells in both market and policy circles: it aims to curb speculation and external capital inflows, but leaves clear gaps in institutional design and enforcement pathways. For investors, this both amplifies risk and signals a need to rethink portfolio stratification.

Event Review

Chiyoda Ward’s request to the real estate association centers on two restrictive provisions:

1. Require that homes sold under systems such as "Comprehensive Design" or within urban redevelopment projects may, in principle, not be resold by the buyer within five years of delivery;

2. Prohibit a single legal name from purchasing multiple units in the same building.

The ward cites rising residential prices, increased foreign speculative purchases, and low owner-occupancy rates that negatively affect condominium management operations and the residential environment.

Urbalytics shows that The Park House Gran Sanbancho rose 2.5x over three years—roughly 10% per month—nearly on par with Bitcoin.

Notably, the ward’s request does not apply universally to all newly built condominiums; it is limited to projects that benefit from urban development incentives such as floor-area ratio or height relaxations.

This "selective application" reflects both administrative practicality and the limited reach of the policy tool.

Why the "Request" Is Unlikely to Be Effective in the Short Term

Even amid such a surge, from legal and administrative practice perspectives, the request would mainly rely on contractual provisions attached to development approvals or special terms in sales contracts to be implemented.

In other words, the administration would require developers to include resale restrictions in contracts to achieve public policy objectives. This approach is workable in negotiations with developers, but it raises several structural issues.

First, the limited scope of applicability produces clear substitution effects. The request targets only projects that receive floor-area bonuses or redevelopment benefits, which are relatively few, while many properties on ordinary land, existing projects, or developments that did not use incentives remain available for trade. Speculative capital and buyers are likely to shift to those alternatives, weakening the overall suppressive effect.

Second, there are practical enforceability issues with contractual restraints. If buyers use overseas companies, affiliated entities, or nominee arrangements, the true beneficiaries can be hard to identify and trace; if nominal ownership is transferred before delivery, or trusts and multilayered holding structures are set up, the contract’s "no resale for five years" clause can be hollow in cross-jurisdictional operations. Additionally, the overlap between civil and administrative law creates disputes: excessive restrictions on the transfer of property rights may impinge on property and contractual freedoms and could face judicial challenges.

Third, enforcement and regulatory boundaries remain unresolved. Even if contracts include resale prohibitions, how would developers or the ward continuously monitor compliance and impose effective sanctions on violators? Would the registry annotate the resale restriction on property records? Or would enforcement rely on developers vetting buyers at transfer? These procedures require institutional support and sustained resource commitments.

Governance Dilemmas and Investment Risks Reflected by the "Request"

Scarcity and location premiums in core wards like Chiyoda make external capital purchases a structural feature of the market. As speculative purchases rise, owner-occupancy declines, consensus in condominium management becomes harder to achieve, and daily management decisions can be adversely affected. Since most rights in a condominium association belong to unit owners, if a majority are non-resident, proxy participation is limited, and information is opaque, long-term maintenance and repair decisions may be delayed, undermining safety and living standards. That, in turn, affects secondary market perceptions of the building’s premium, creating a vicious cycle.

For investors, the most immediate risks are liquidity and policy risk. If purchases carry time-limited resale bans, short-term exit and arbitrage strategies are cut off and investors face higher liquidity costs; should financial strain or personal circumstances (e.g., divorce, job relocation) arise, forced liquidation becomes significantly more difficult and costly. Compliance costs also rise: more sophisticated KYC (know-your-customer) and compliance reviews are required to verify buyer identities and ultimate beneficiaries, and developers must bear higher compliance obligations.

Faced with this policy signal, rational investors should recognize parallel paths of opportunity and risk. In the short term, projects not covered by the request may become preferred destinations for external capital, and supply–demand mismatches will produce bifurcated market dynamics—regulated projects may become more attractive to long-term owner-occupiers due to liquidity discounts; unrestricted projects, especially in comparable locations but not benefiting from incentives, may attract speculative demand and maintain short-term price strength. Over the medium to long term, if authorities continue to trade "development incentives for improved residential conditions," the market may develop a stronger "premium for statutorily unrestricted resale"—i.e., unrestricted projects lose premium while restricted projects suited for owner-occupation or long holding gain appeal among buyers who prioritize compliance and living quality. This presents opportunities for long-term allocations geared toward rental income or owner-occupation.

Market Outlook

Looking ahead, Chiyoda Ward’s request could become an early experiment for core urban areas seeking to counter speculation and foreign capital inflows. Whether it can be scaled across Tokyo or nationwide depends on three factors: legal practicability, administrative and judicial support, and central government–level standardization. In the short term, local governments are more likely to continue using tools tied to development gains, requiring developers to assume social responsibilities in contracts so they accept circulation restrictions in exchange for floor-area benefits.

A deeper trend is strengthening transparency and beneficial-owner disclosure regimes. In an anti–money-laundering (AML) and cross-border capital control environment, real estate—being high-value and relatively easy to mask—will attract scrutiny. If laws or guidelines emerge requiring foreign corporate or individual buyers to disclose ultimate beneficial owners in property transactions, regulatory effectiveness would increase significantly and reduce opportunities to circumvent contractual limits via nominees. Fiscal policy is also a deployable tool: higher short-term capital gains taxes, or higher fixed asset or transaction tax rates for non-residents, are feasible alternatives that do not directly restrict ownership transfers. The diversity of the policy toolkit will determine whether "curbing speculation" evolves from pilot to norm.

Under current and foreseeable policy trajectories, investors should adjust expectations and horizon management. If the objective is owner-occupation or long holding, prioritize projects that—despite potential restrictions—offer superior governance, location, and lifestyle convenience. If relying on short-term arbitrage, be wary of policy-driven liquidity risk and build sufficient buffers for possible discounts.

Conclusion

Chiyoda Ward’s request is both a warning against speculative purchases and a probe into the boundaries of the current institutional framework.

For investors, the critical takeaway is to incorporate "policy risk" as a routine variable in asset evaluation, and to use data-driven due diligence, staged entry, and contractual risk-transfer mechanisms to preserve capital and liquidity.

References

• [Source: Chiyoda Ward Office (Chiyoda Ward website), 2025, https://www.city.chiyoda.lg.jp/]

• [Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, "Real Estate Transaction Price Information (Web version) WeBLand", official data platform, https://www.land.mlit.go.jp/webland/]

• [Source: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, urban planning and development explanations regarding the Comprehensive Design system and urban redevelopment, https://www.mlit.go.jp/]

• [Source: Tokyo Kantei Co., Ltd. (Kantei) market report: Tokyo 23-ward condominium prices and trend analysis, https://www.kantei.co.jp/]

• [Source: Nikkei (Nihon Keizai Shimbun) series on central Tokyo condominium prices and foreign capital trends, https://www.nikkei.com/]